Ira K. Hearn v. Utah Liquor Control Commission : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Ira K. Hearn v. Utah Liquor Control Commission :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; William W. Barrett; Assistant Attorney General; Robert M.
Taylor; Attorneys for Respondent.
D. Ray Owen, Jr.; Attorney for Petitioner.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hearn v. Utah Liquor Control, No. 14269.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/227
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IRA K. HEARN, JR., 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
RECEIVED 
TAW LIBRARY 
0 5 MAR 1976 
6RI6HAM YOUnG UNiVBfSPT C a s e N o . j
 R e L , j , e n c | a ? k L $ { ' . 
14269 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE DECISION OF 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
D. RAY OWEN, JR . 
S u i t e 564 K e n n e c o t t B u i l d i n g 
Ten E a s t Sou th Temple 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133 
A t t o r n e y fo r P e t i t i o n e r 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
ROBERT M. TAYLOR 
S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t 
23 6 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Responden t 
U _, EL U. 
JAN 15'1976 
Cbtl4 £«*»»$ VE»Kt. 4&fr 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE • 1 
DISPOSITION BY THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
A. THE CHARGE MADE AGAINST PETITIONER 
DID CONSTITUTE "CAUSE" FOR REMOVAL FROM 
THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 5 
B. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT 
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY, OR UNR EA SONA BLY 
IN DISMISSING PETITIONER 12 
POINT II: PETITIONER WAS OFFERED A FULL 
AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE CHARGES, 
PRESENT HIS DEFENSE AND PRESERVE HIS 
RECORD FOR APPEAL 16 
CONCLUSION 24 
CASES CITED 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 6 
L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) 17 
Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975) 17 
Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975) 17 
Goss v. Lopez, U.S. , 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) 17 
Mullane y. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) 17 
Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 226 P.2d 531 (1951) 6-9,13,16-21 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-4 (Supp. 1975) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-5.5 (Supp. 1975) 1,5-8,16,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-6 (Supp. 1975) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-32.6 (1953) 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IRA K. HEARN, J R . , 
. 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
: Case No. 
- v s - 14269 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, : 
Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner is requesting review of a public hearing 
held pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-5.5(3), as amended in 
1975, to determine whether there was cause to remove petitioner 
from the office of Director of the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission; and of a decision made by the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission pursuant thereto. 
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DISPOSITION BI THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION 
The hearing was held before the Utah Liquor 
Control Commission on August 22, 1975. On September 3# 
1975, the Commission issued an order removing petitioner 
from the office of Director of the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, effective immediately. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW . 
Respondent requests that the decision of the 
Utah Liquor Control Commission be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner assumed the position of Director 
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission on January 2, 1975, 
after being approached by the Governor about the position on 
December 19, 1974 (Hearing Transcript-18) and officially 
approved by the Commissioners shortly thereafter (HT-17) . 
He was serving in that position on Thursday, August 14, 
1975, when he was called to the office of the Commission 
(HT-25) . 
' -2- . 
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At that time, he was handed a letter which 
gave him notice of a hearing to be held eight days later, 
on August 22, 1975, to determine whether or not he should 
remain as Director of the Commission. The notice explained 
the "cause," an inefficient working relationship, in this 
manner: 
" I t i s the opinion of the Commission 
tha t d i f f i c u l t i e s have a r i sen over the l a s t 
s ix months between t h e Director of the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission and the Commission 
members. I t i s the Commission's opinion tha t 
these d i f f i c u l t i e s prevent us from working 
amicably and cohesively with you as Director 
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission. 
Because of t h i s , we fee l t h a t the Commission's 
business i s not being car r ied out in a co-
opera t ive manner nor with a singleness of 
purpose." /""Commissioner1 s Ce r t i f i ca t ion of 
Documents, here inaf te r Com. Ce r t . , Paragraph 
4, No. l.JZ 
Five days l a t e r , in a prompt response to an August 
19 l e t t e r from p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel (Com. Ce r t . , Para. 6, 
No. 3) , the Commission explained tha t the " d i f f i c u l t i e s " 
amount t o : 
" . . .a general deterioration of 
communication and direction between the 
Commission and Director which leaves 
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the Commission with no confidence 
in the Di rec to r . " 
And, with r e spec t to the request for more t ime, the Com-
mission expressed t h e i r feeling t h a t , due to the 
non-adversary nature of the forthcoming hear ing , the time 
allowed was adequate. 
A publ ic hearing was held on Friday, August 22, 
1975, a t 9:00 a.m. Mr. Robert Thurraan moderated the 
hear ing . Present were: the Commissioners, Mr. Hulbert , 
Mr.^Corkey, and Mr. Durbano, and t h e i r a t to rney , William 
W. B a r r e t t , Ass i s tan t Attorney General; Director Hearn and 
h is counsel , Robert B. Hansen, Deputy Attorney General; 
a c e r t i f i e d shorthand r e p o r t e r ; and a number of concerned 
c i t i z e n s . The t h r e e commissioners, in t u r n , explained 
the reason ("cause") for the ac t ion being considered, and 
offered spec i f i c examples. Due to the nature of the i s sue 
being considered, no cross-examination of these statements 
or any subsequent statement was allowed. Director Hearn 
offered a statement by and through his counse l ' s examina-
t i o n . Thereaf ter , members of the publ ic offered opinion 
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and discussion of the spec i f i c examples in to the record, 
some through pre-arranged questioning by Mr. Hansen, 
On September 3# 1975, the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission made 13 findings based on the record and 
ordered p e t i t i o n e r ' s d i smissa l , e f fec t ive immediately. 
The vote was a 2-0 majori ty, with Chairman Hulbert 
abs t a in ing . 
Mr. Hearn has pe t i t i oned t h i s Court for a review 
as to whether a "cause" for removal was es tab l i shed within 
the s p i r i t of Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-5.5 (Supp. 1975) and 
whether the hearing was f a i r and reasonable with respect 
to h i s s t a tu to ry and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A . THE CHARGE MADE AGAINST PETITIONER DID 
CONSTITUTE "CAUSE" FOR REMOVAL FROM THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR 
OF THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION. 
I t i s respondent ' s pos i t ion t h a t , when the 
spec i f ic nature of the of f ice i s taken into account, 
the i n a b i l i t y to perform within an e f f i c i e n t working 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p c o n s t i t u t e s "cause" for removal from the 
d i r e c t o r s h i p of t h e Utah Liquor Control Commission 
within the intended meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-5.5 # 
as amended in 1975. 
Where a public off icer may only be removed 
from off ice for "cause/ 1 and no s tandards are provided, 
what cons t i t u t e s such "cause" i s determined by reference 
to the character of t he office in ques t ion . As p e t i -
t ioner a s s e r t s , Taylor v . Lee, 119 Utah 302, 226 P.2d 
531 (1951), (hereinaf ter c i t e d as Taylor v. Lee or Taylor) 
provides Utah 's most cogent guidel ines for defining "cause." 
(See p e t i t i o n e r ' s b r i e f , page 8.) The Court the re noted: 
"/""Removing for c a u s e d in fe r s 
tha t the off ice-holder has f a i l e d t o 
perform his dut ies or was incompetent 
or unsui table for the pos i t ion to 
which he was appointed and d i r e c t l y 
r e f l e c t s upon his o f f i c i a l or personal 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . " 119 Utah 317-317. 
Out of necess i ty , t h i s standard i s a general one which must 
be appl ied t o the of f ice in quest ion on a case by case 
b a s i s . Those who apply i t should cha rac t e r i ze the off ice 
and i t s r e q u i s i t e d u t i e s t o determine what would c o n s t i t u t e 
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cause for removal from that office with respect to the 
above-stated guidelines. Then the specific circumstances 
should be tested against those general determinations. 
For example/ in Taylor v. Lee, Taylor was a 
member of the Commission of Finance, who was serving the 
public directly and was responsible to the public. 
Further, as the Court carefully noted, his appointment 
was for a definite term of years (119 Utah at 311). 
Because of these comparatively independent characteristics 
of the office, the Court was compelled to make a factual 
determination as to whether Taylor had failed to perform 
his duty, was incompetent, or was unsuitable for the 
position—any one of which would constitute "cause" for 
removal. The Court centered its analysis upon factual 
evidence which was claimed to have shown incompetence 
and inefficiency. (119 Utah 321# et seq.) 
The situation in the case at bar is to be 
distinguished from that in Taylor. Here we have a public 
official whose primary responsibility, in fact, is to 
the commissioners who are, in turn, responsible to the 
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public. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 32-1-4; 32-1-5.5(1), (2)
 # 
( 4 ) ; 3 2 - 1 - 6 (a) , (m)
 # (n) , (o) (Supp. 1975). The director 
of the liquor commission receives his statutory directive 
from Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-5.5 (Supp. 1975): 
" (1) * * * The director shall be 
the executive and administrative head 
of the liquor control commission and 
shall carry out the policy of the 
commission. * * * He * * * shall 
possess such other qualifications as 
may be prescribed by the commission. 
(2) The director i s accountable 
to the liquor control commission for 
the faithful performance of his duties 
and for carrying out the commission's 
policies» 
(3j * * * 
(4) Subject to the powers and 
responsibil i t ies delegated to the 
commission by th is act, the director 
shal l : 
(a) * * * 
(b) Within the general 
guidelines,policies, and procedures 
approved by the commission, provide 
day-to-day direction, co-ordination 
and delegation of responsibil i t ies 
in the administrative ac t iv i t ies of 
the commission. 
* * * 
(g) Perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law 
* * * and assist the commission in 
the proper discharge of i t s duties 
and responsibi l i t ies ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Thus, the key to the d i r e c t o r ' s performance i s s t a t u t o r i l y 
couched in h i s day-to-day working r e l a t i o n s h i p with the 
commission. With respect to his i n t e r e s t i n the of f ice , 
the d i r ec to r i s in a pos i t ion analogous to tha t of a 
cabinet o f f i c i a l . Uniquely, he i s not appointed for a 
term of y e a r s ; nor i s he pro tec ted by s t a t e "merit worker" 
s t a t u t e s . Rather, he serves in a pos i t ion which has an 
uncer ta in durat ion and, by design, has only a hearing on 
"cause" to assure him t h a t , i f and when he i s eventual ly 
removed, i t w i l l not be for p o l i t i c a l or t r i f l i n g reasons . 
Presumably, the pos i t ion was provided for because 
of the p u b l i c ' s i n t e r e s t in a smooth-running, e f f i c i en t 
government. Therefor, the d i r ec to r i s to advise other 
public o f f i c i a l s and to implement the p o l i c i e s they make. 
By s t a tu to ry design, t h i s pos i t ion has no na tu ra l end; he 
w i l l serve u n t i l he i s removed for "cause" or chooses to 
r e s i g n . This s i t u a t i o n i s vas t ly d i f fe ren t from the one 
in the Taylor c a s e . In t h i s case , t he same public i n t e r e s t 
in a smooth-running, e f f i c i e n t government must allow for 
removal of t h i s of f ice-holder when those to vrtiom he i s 
- 9 -
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responsible decide tha t " * * * business i s not being 
ca r r i ed out in a cooperat ive manner nor with a s i n g l e -
ness of purpose" (Com. C e r t . , para . 4, No. 1) and are 
l e f t " * * * with no confidence in the Di rec to r . " 
(Com. C e r t . , pa ra . 6, No. 3.) 
Governor Rampton, in h i s January 20, 1975, 
l e t t e r to Chairman Hulbert , suggesting s t r u c t u r a l 
gu ide l ines , very ap t ly warned t h a t , " * * * the most 
i dea l s t ruc tu re cannot y i e ld good management where 
the re i s not cooperation and good feel ing between those 
respons ib le for the implementation of the program." 
(Supp. C e r t i f i c a t i o n of P e t i t i o n e r , Para . 2.) Cer t a in ly , 
a determinat ion of "cause" for removal of the d i r ec to r 
must take i n to account the unique charac te r of the 
of f ice and t h i s need for cohesion. As expressed in 
t h e i r no t i ce l e t t e r t o the d i r e c t o r (Com. C e r t . , para . 
4 , No. 1) , the commissioners were of the opinion t h a t 
the p e t i t i o n e r ' s a t t i t u d e and conduct v io l a t ed the 
mandate of the sec t ion of the Liquor Control Act 
quoted above. I t was far from a secre t t h a t the 
-10« 
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petitioner disagreed conceptually in management 
philosophy with the commissioners. (See HT-20,23, 
39,40,41,42.) In f ac t , in p e t i t i o n e r ' s b r i e f (p. 
15-16), i t i s proudly proclaimed t h a t : 
"His opinion t h a t three f u l l 
time Commissioners were nei ther 
necessary nor desi rable for the 
formulation of policy and tended 
t o provoke con f l i c t and controversy 
in day-to-day admini s t r a t i on was 
sound, qual i f ied and in the best 
i n t e r e s t s of sound publ ic 
adminis t ra t ion of the agency." 
The respondents , l ike the Governor, f ee l t h a t sound 
public adminis t ra t ion of the agency i s couched in 
cohesion and cooperat ion, not conf l i c t and controversy. 
In August, 1975, they decided t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
convictions had influenced h is behavior# and had affected 
t he i r working r e l a t i o n s h i p , which the l e g i s l a t o r s had made 
so v i t a l to h i s p o s i t i o n . They were responsible to the 
public for h i s work as wel l as t h e i r own. The commissioners 
decided t h a t i t was in the p u b l i c f s best i n t e r e s t to consider 
removal for cause . 
- 1 1 -
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A n a l y s i s i n j e c t s t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t o t h e 
" u n s u i t a b l e f o r t h e p o s i t i o n " s t a n d a r d on " c a u s e " s e t 
f o r t h a b o v e . A d i r e c t o r who i s u n a b l e t o s e r v e t h e 
commis s ion " a m i c a b l y and c o h e s i v e l y " may n o t b e 
s u i t a b l e fo r t h e j o b . T h i s s i t u a t i o n c o n s i s t u t e s a 
" c a u s e " f o r r e m o v a l from o f f i c e upon which a p u b l i c 
h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s s h o u l d b e h e l d . 
T h u s , i t h a s b e e n shown t h a t t h e Utah 
L i q u o r C o n t r o l Commiss ion d i d s t a t e a v i a b l e a n d 
v a l i d " c a u s e " f o r r e m o v a l when, i n t h e i r n o t i c e t o 
p e t i t i o n e r , t h e y e x p l a i n e d t h a t " * ; * * d i f f i c u l t i e s 
p r e v e n t u s from w o r k i n g a m i c a b l y and c o h e s i v e l y w i t h 
you * * * / and t h a t _ 7 Z b _ / e c a u s e of t h i s , we f e e l 
t h a t t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s b u s i n e s s i s n o t b e i n g c a r r i e d 
o u t i n a c o o p e r a t i v e manner n o r w i t h a s i n g l e n e s s 
o f p u r p o s e . " 
B . THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY# 
CAPRICIOUSLY, OR UNREASONABLY IN DISMISSING PETITIONER. 
- 1 2 -
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Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-32.6 (1953), the 
s t a t u t e upon which p e t i t i o n e r ' s standing for review i s 
based, d i r e c t s t h a t the i ssue under review s h a l l extend 
no further than t o determine whether the Commission 
" regular ly pursued i t s au thor i ty . " In deciding t h i s 
i s sue : 
" * * * The findings and 
conclusions of the commission on 
quest ions of fact s h a l l be f i na l 
and sha l l not be subject to review. 
Such questions of fac t s h a l l include 
u l t ima te fac t s and findings and 
conclusions of the commission on 
reasonableness and d i s c r e t i o n . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-32.6 (1953). 
S imi la r ly t the Court in Taylor ruled tha t j u d i c i a l 
review of the quest ion of cause should t e s t only for 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s . In the Taylor case , J u s t i c e Latimer 
explained: 
"We bel ieve the bes t ru l e t o 
be that i f t he re i s any evidence of 
a l e g a l and subs t an t i a l ba s i s 
reasonably tending to support the 
Governor's f indings , then he has 
not been a r b i t r a r y and h is decision 
should be affirmed." Id . a t 320. 
- 1 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thus, i f a va l id cause has been s t a t ed , the Court may 
only check to see t ha t the decis ion upon t h e hearing 
on tha t cause was not a r b i t r a r y . The s t a t u t e c i t e d 
above makes t h i s e spec i a l ly t rue where a matter of 
d i s c r e t i o n i s being reviewed. 
The p e t i t i o n for review a t hand r e p r e s e n t s 
such a ca se . The "cause" before the commission— 
u n s u i t a b i l i t y for the position—was one which was 
necessa r i ly couched in personal f ee l ings and opinions 
concerning the l iquor commission and the working 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the commissioners and the 
d i r e c t o r . The decis ion t o be made had t o be d i s -
c re t ionary in nature , not f a c t u a l . 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s own testimony provided enough 
evidence to j u s t i f y the Commission in t h e i r d i s c r e -
t ionary conclusion t h a t t h e i r "cause" for removing 
the d i r e c t o r had been s u b s t a n t i a t e d . To begin wi th , 
h is testimony i s peppered with references t o 
in f igh t ing about the ba s i c phi losophies of managing 
the commission. (See e spec ia l ly HT-33,34,39,40,41,42.) 
-14-
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This d i f f i c u l t y went beyond a mere di f ference in 
p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f . I t went to the hear t of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i r ec to r and the commission 
and appears t o have created a wall between them. 
Further# p e t i t i o n e r ' s reference (at HT-32) to "a t 
l e a s t 20 recommendations or s tud ie s or proposals 
t o the Commission" to vvhich he received only one 
response ind ica tes a lack of concerted action within 
the commission, another par t of the "cause" for 
removal. F ina l l y , the Commision's f indings upon 
t h e record br ing out examples, v*iich when accumulated, 
make evident the continuing ef fec t of the ph i losoph ica l / 
r e l a t i o n s h i p d i f f i c u l t i e s . There, the commission noted 
speci f ic r e s u l t a n t behavior by p e t i t i o n e r which was 
outside h i s r o l e of advisor and implementor of 
Commission po l i cy . Those a c t s need not be recounted 
here, s ince they are c l ea r l y se t fo r th in the f ind ings . 
Respondent a s s e r t s tha t the Utah Liquor. 
Control Commission found subs t an t i a l evidence in the 
hearing record t h a t there was cause for Director Hearn's 
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d i s m i s s a l . F u r t h e r , r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e 
Commission d i d n o t a c t a r b i t r a r i l y o r c a p r i c i o u s l y 
o r w i t h o u t r e a s o n i n u s i n g i t s d i s c r e t i o n a n d 
a u t h o r i t y t o o r d e r s a i d d i s m i s s a l . 
POINT I I 
PETITIONER WAS OFFERED A FULL AND FAIR 
OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE CHARGES, PRESENT HIS DEFENSE 
AND PRESERVE HIS RECORD FOR APPEAL. 
U t a h l a w p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e D i r e c t o r o f 
t h e Utah L i q u o r C o n t r o l Commission may o n l y be 
removed from o f f i c e a f t e r a p u b l i c h e a r i n g , Utah 
Code Ann . § 3 2 - 1 - 5 . 5 ( 3 ) (Supp . 1 9 7 5 ) . The Code 
d o e s n o t p r o v i d e p r o c e d u r a l g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e h e a r i n g , 
h o w e v e r . P e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e Augus t 2 2 , 1975 , 
h e a r i n g d i d n o t s a t i s f y t h e "minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s " 
f o r s u c h a h e a r i n g , c i t i n g T a y l o r v . L e e , s u p r a , and 
some c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . T h e s e "minimum 
r e q u i r e m e n t s " a r e b a s e d upon t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r o t e c t i o n s of d u e p r o c e s s o f l a w . I t i s r e s p o n d e n t ' s 
p o s i t i o n t h a t , when a n a l y z e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
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s p i r i t of the due process concept, the hearing in 
question was adequate and f a i r with respect to 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s i n t e r e s t s # and thereby s a t i s f i e d the 
minimum requirements of procedural due process . 
I t i s basic t o the concept of procedural 
due process t h a t the type of procedural safeguards 
required depends on the issue being considered. 
In one recent case i t was held t h a t : 
"Unlike some legal r u l e s , due 
process i s protean in na tu re . The 
determination of what process i s 
due depends on appropriate 
accomodation of the competing 
i n t e r e s t s involved." 
Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382, 386 (3d Ci r . 1975), c i t ing 
Goss v . Lopez, U.S. , 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), 
and Cafeteria Workers v . McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 
6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (19 61) . See also Mullane v . Centra l 
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 94 L.Ed. 865 
(1950); and Frost v . Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 66 (2d 
C i r . 1975), where i t was noted t h a t : 
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"/TtJ/he / U n i t e d S ta tes 
Supreme^,/ Court f s decis ions can 
be f a i r l y summarized as holding 
tha t the required degree of 
procedural safeguards va r i e s 
d i r e c t l y with the importance of 
the p r iva te i n t e r e s t affected 
and the need for and usefulness 
of the p a r t i c u l a r safeguard in 
the given circumstances and 
inversely with the burden and 
any o ther adverse consequences 
of affording i t . " 
A r t i c l e I , Section 7 of the Utah Const i tu t ion 
assures Utahns of the r igh t to due process. As mentioned 
e a r l i e r , the Utah Code Annotated assures the commission's 
d i r e c t o r a hearing before removal for cause. Taylor v. 
Lee, Utah 's p r inc ip l e expression on t h e procedure for 
removal of an off ice-holder for cause, speaks in due 
process terms (see 119 Utah 315-317). Spec i f i ca l ly , 
the hea r ing ' s purpose i s t o assure the of f ice-holder 
t h a t he may be deprived of his office only for cause— 
"and not for p o l i t i c a l or t r i f l i n g reasons ." 119 Utah 
316. Recognizing t h a t , in Utah, there i s no property 
r i gh t in holding a public o f f ice (see 119 Utah 316) , 
the Court noted that there are ind iv idua l r ights 
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at tached to an of f ice which must be protec ted by a 
public hear ing . Thereby, the off ice-holder would be 
given a reasonable opportunity t o present h i s side* 
Pursuant to the above p r i n c i p l e s , the 
Court s t a t e d : 
" * * * tha t the minimum 
requirements are t h e s e : (1) 
A wr i t t en not ice of the nature 
of the charges couched in ordinary 
and understandable language; (2) 
a no t ice of the time and place of 
hear ing; (3) an opportunity by the 
of f ice-holder t o be heard and 
answer the charges; (4) the r igh t 
to be represented by counsel, with 
opportunity for cross-examination; 
and (5) the presence of a repor te r to 
preserve the testimony so t h a t , if 
necessary, the question of cause can 
be made the subject of j u d i c i a l review." 
The Court immediately added: 
"While these requirements would 
appear to require a fu l l dress hear ing , 
the proceedings can and should be 
admin is t ra t ive ly conducted." Taylor 
v . Lee, 119 Utah 302, 316, 226 P.2d 
531 (1951) . 
When applying these requirements to d i f fe ren t 
s i t u a t i o n s one must be sure to apply with them the 
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principle of protean due process. While circumstances 
in many cases will be so similar that the noted guide-
lines will be followed without variance/ some will be 
different to such a degree that the requirements may 
be molded to fit the different situation and still 
provide the essence of the protection* This is 
especially true in an administratively conducted 
hearing. In Taylor# the Court expressed the essence 
of its holding when it propounded that the real 
issue was whether " * * * plaintiff was offered a 
full and fair opportunity to meet the charges, present 
his defense and preserve his record for appeal. . . ." 
(119 Utah 318.) With these concepts in mind/ it may 
be projected that the due process test of such 
hearing procedure is whether it was (1) fair# and 
(2) reasonable under the circumstances. 
As explained above, it is evident that the 
case at bar is very different from that in Taylor v. 
Lee.. Petitioner was serving an indefinite term in 
office, implying even less of an interest in the 
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off ice than Taylor could claim. He held a cabinet- type 
pos i t ion with respec t to the commission--which made him 
d i r e c t l y respons ib le to them, ra ther than the p u b l i c . 
Fur ther , Mr, Hearn had a day-to-day working r e l a t i o n s h i p 
with the commission. I t i s these d i f fe rences , plus the 
d i sc re t iona ry nature of t h e "cause" at i s sue , which 
combined t o allow some remolding of the "minimum r e q u i r e -
ments" l i s t e d in Taylor without taking away from the 
essence of the r u l i n g . 
P e t i t i o n e r , on August 14, 1975, was given 
wr i t ten not ice of the nature of the charges . Looking 
to the circumstances, respondent a s s e r t s , the l e t t e r 
from the Commissioners f a i r l y s t a t ed the "cause" (as 
argued at length above), and were reasonable in t h e i r 
expectat ion t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r , with whom they worked 
every day, would understand i t s na tu r e . Moreover, i f 
there was any doubt in the p e t i t i o n e r ' s mind, respondents1 
August 19, 1975 (Com. C e r t . , para . 5, No.2) response to 
a request for s p e c i f i c i t y made c l e a r the general , non-
fac tual character of the problem. 
- 2 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As for not ice of the time and place of the 
hearing to be held, p e t i t i o n e r claims no e r r o r . Both 
were c l e a r l y se t fo r th in the no t ice l e t t e r (Com. 
Cer t . # para* 4, No. 1) . 
The t h i r d of the "minimum requirements" to 
be afforded the off ice-holder i s an opportunity t o be 
heard and answer the charges . Pe t i t i one r was given . 
e ight days1 no t ice of the "cause" to be a t i ssue in 
the hea r ing . Considering the d i sc re t i ona ry nature of 
the "cause" and consequent non-adversary charac ter of 
the hearing ( there would be no need to prepare a 
defense to f ac tua l i s s u e s ) , e ight days was s u f f i c i e n t . 
Respondents voiced t h i s convict ion in t h e i r answer to 
an untimely reques t—af te r f ive of the e ight days— 
by p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel for a delay (see Com. Cer t . # 
para . 6, No. 3 ) . In t h i s case, p e t i t i o n e r needed only 
t o prepare h i s s ide in a way ca lcu la ted t o convince 
the commission tha t t h e i r lack of confidence was 
un jus t i f i ed or would be r epa i r ed . At the hearing, 
a f t e r the commissioners explained the cause to the 
pub l i c , p e t i t i o n e r was given a f a i r opportunity t o 
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respond to the charges; and took advantage of i t . He 
was even allowed to c a l l upon c e r t a i n members of the 
public to express t h e i r views. This opportunity to be 
heard was more than adequate, and c e r t a i n l y f a i r and 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
Pe t i t i one r makes no claims t h a t he was not 
adequately represented by counsel . But he does claim 
tha t the den ia l of cross-examination of those who 
offered personal opinions i n to the record cons t i t u t ed 
a denia l of procedural due process . Respondent contends 
t h a t , under the circumstances, t h i s procedure was not 
due to p e t i t i o n e r and, fu r the r , t ha t cross-examination 
would have been meaningless had i t been allowed. The 
"cause" was an i s sue for d i s c r e t i on , not fac tua l 
determinat ion. Cross-examination is a too l used in 
t r i a l s and t r i a l - l i k e adjudicat ions to bring out the 
t r u t h . In considering a d i sc re t ionary dec is ion , i t i s 
opinions and ideas which are of primary i n t e r e s t to the 
examiners, not fac tua l t r u t h . In t h i s hear ing, c r o s s -
es-
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e x a m i n a t i o n would n o t have a i d e d p e t i t i o n e r . As shown 
i n t h e p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h , p e t i t i o n e r was g i v e n a f a i r 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t h i s s i d e . C r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n would 
n o t have made i t more f a i r . The d e n i a l was r e a s o n a b l e 
unde r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and f a i r t o b o t h s i d e s . 
P e t i t i o n e r d o e s n o t c l a i m e r r o r w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o t h e r e c o r d o f t h e h e a r i n g . 
CONCLUSION 
P u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 3 2 - 1 - 5 . 5 (Supp . 
1 9 7 5 ) # and the applicable requirements of due process 
with respect to hearings, the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission held a hearing on a valid "cause" for 
removal of their director, found substantial informa-
tion in the record of the hearing to support that 
cause, gave the director a full and fair opportunity 
to meet the charges, present his defense and preserve 
his record for this appeal, and, therefore, validly 
dismissed petitioner from the position he had held. 
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Respondent respectfully urges that their 
decision dismissing petitioner be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT M. TAYLOR 
Special Assistant 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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